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the Security Trust case and for the same reasons."7 2 The Supreme
Court found the cases indistinguishable from Security Trust and from
each other, 3 and ruled that the state's characterization of its liens was
not binding on the federal court; the competing liens were, for federal
purposes, inchoate. The Supreme Court, although thus given the op-
portunity to review and perhaps alter its decision, in no uncertain or
vague language, affirmed the Security Trust case.
The various writers have differed as to whether or not the federal
tax claims should be given absolute priority" and have presented sound
arguments in support of both positions. No matter which course is
favored, there is a need for congressional clarification in this area.
Congress should review the system of priorities in the various statu-
tory provisions and establish precise and uniform standards to control
the courts in the determination of the priorities of federal tax claims
and competing liens.
EMBEZZLEMENT AND INCOME UNDER THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE
The federal income tax, primary source of revenue for the National
Government, is levied upon "all income from any source whatever."'-
This broad definition encompasses income from illegal business opera-
72. United States v. Acri, 75 Sup. Ct. 239, 241 (1955).
73. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 75 Sup. Ct. 247, 248
(1955).
74. For arguments favoring federal priority see Sarner, supra note 34, at 746
(1947). For those opposing federal priority see Kennedy, supra note 10; Note, 29
N.C.L. REv. 293, 300 (1951).
1. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a). This section replaces Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 22(a), 52 STAT. 457, but does not appreciably alter its interpretation. 1 CCH 1955
STAND. FED. TAX REP., 636.
2. Bootlegging: United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927); Maddas v.
Commissioner, 114 F.2d 548 (3rd Cir. 1940); Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564
(2nd Cir. 1926). Black market operations: United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997
(7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied 335 U.S. 853 (1948); Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253
(1948). Lotteries: Droge v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 829 (1937); Huntington v.
Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 835 (1937). Bookmaking: James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A.
326 (1925). Usurious loans: Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938);
Mitchell M. Frey, 1 B.T.A. 338 (1925) ; Terrell v. Commissioner, 7 B.T.A. 773 (1927).
Unlawful insurance policies: Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (D.C. Cir. 1937).
Fraudulent land sales: Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1954). Illegal
movie transportation: George L. Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316 (1929). Income from abor-
tion: Mary Luginbuhl, 8 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 968 (1949).
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tions2 and unlawful practices3 as well as from lawful occupations, save
for one area of crime. Funds obtained by embezzlement and larceny
have not been held taxable income.' To the honest taxpayer it may seem
anomalous that this exception exists. While this immunity has limited
practical justification, it has little legal validity and prevents the broad,
sure criterion of taxability necessary for administrative convenience.
Proceeds from larceny have never been considered subject to taxa-
tion as income for a simple, practical reason. If the thief was appre-
hended, the property was returned to the victim.' If the criminal
escaped, the Government did not know on whom to levy the tax. Legally,
the argument not to tax stolen money hinges on the concept that title to
stolen property remains in the victim. Embezzlement, a more sophisti-
cated form of larceny, has long been disputed in tax law.
Early cases grouped embezzlement with larceny and exempted such
illegal gains from taxation.' By 1942, after a Treasury Department
ruling that embezzlement funds were taxable,7 the circuit courts were
split over the matter.8 In 1946 the Supreme Court "settled" the dis-
3. Graft: Chadick v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 609 (1935). Protection payments: Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) ;
Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942). Kickbacks: Caldwell v.
Commissioner, 135 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1943). Card playing: Weiner v. Commissioner,
10 B.T.A. 905 (1928). Commercial Bribes: United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59
(2d Cir. 1955). Influence selling: Reichert v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.
1954). Extortion: Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952); Estate of Joseph
Nitto, 13 T.C. 858 (1949). Swindling (obtaining money by false pretenses): Rol-
linger v. United States, 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953); Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718
(5th Cir. 1948). Illegally obtained salaries: Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278
(1953) ; National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938).
See Geller & Rogers, How The Federal Income Tax Applies To Illegal and Unlawfid
Gains, 27 TAXEs 214 (1949).
4. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946); Steinberg v. United States, 14
F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926) (dictum); Rau v. United States, 260 Fed. 131, 136 (2d
Cir. 1919) (dictum). See 1 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.11 (1942);
Note, Income Tax Consequences of Theft, 35 VA. L. Rav. 759, 767 (1949).
5. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1926); Cf. Bank of United
States v. Bank of Washington, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 299, 304-5 (1832).
6. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926); Rau v. United
States, 260 Fed. 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1919) (both dictum).
7. G.C.M. 16572, XV-1 Cum. BULL. 82 (1936).
8. Embezzled funds were held taxable in Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (8th
Cir. 1942). The Kurrle case relied on National City Bank of New York v. Helvering,
98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938), which expressly overruled Rau v. United States, 260 Fed.
131 (2d Cir. 1919).
Emebezzled funds were held not taxable income in McKnight v. Commissioner, 127
F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942). This court anticipated the Wilcox case by seeking to protect
the victim against a preferential tax lien which would interfere with the victim's re-
covery of the converted funds. Id. at 574.
NOTES
pute in Commissioner v. Wilcox.9  Speaking through Mr. Justice Mur-
phy, the Court held that embezzled money does not constitute taxable
income to the embezzler, although he has used it as his own and although
the victim was granted a tax deduction for his loss.'" The real question
was whether or not the taxpayer received income under a "claim of
right."'" To qualify as taxable income, funds must be obtained under a
bona fide legal or equitable claim and the holder must have no duty to
repay the money.'"  Mere possession of the stolen funds was not suffi-
cient to render them taxable as income in the embezzler's hands." The
policy reason behind the Court's decision was the desire to allow the
victim to regain possession of his money unfettered by the government's
preferential lien.'4
Even under the Wilcox rule, however, embezzled funds could be-
come taxable. If the statute of limitations runs through the victim's
negligence or condonation, the embezzler is vested with an irrefutable
legal claim, and the illegal gain would become taxable income.' " To
9. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946). See Holzman, Tax Classics, 29
TAXEs 764 (1951); 22 IND. L.J. 99 (1946); 7 ALA. LAw. 332 (1946); 26 B.U.L. Rxv.
404 (1946); 34 CALIF. L. REV. 449 (1946); 46 CoLum. L. REv. 667 (1946); 14 GEO.
WAsH. L. Rxv. 650 (1946); 9 GA. B.J. 107 (1946); 44 MIcH. L. REv. 885 (1946); 30
MINN. L. REv. 308 (1946); 20 So. CAL. L. Rav. 113 (1946); 25 TaX. L. REv. 693
(1946); 20 Tm. L. REv. 628 (1946) ; 1947 Wis. L. REv. 114.
10. 327 U.S. at 409 (1946).
11. Id. at 408. The Court admitted, however, that "... no single, conclusive cri-
terion has yet been found to determine in all situations what is a sufficient gain to
support the imposition of an income tax. No more can be said in general than that all
relevant facts and circumstances must be considered." Id. at 407.
12. Id. at 408.
13. Ibid.
14. Id. at 410. "Sanctioning a tax under the circumstances before us would serve
only to give the United States an unjustified preference as to part of the money which
rightfully and completely belongs to the taxpayer's employer." Ibid.
As a result of Wilcox the embezzler prosecuted for tax evasion was placed in a
ludicrous position. After having stolen from his employer he must then argue earnestly
that his victim would be harmed should the tax lien attach and drain the assets of the
embezzler. Such concern for the rights of the victim seenis slightly belated. Further-
more, it requires the embezzler to confess to a more serious crime to defend against the
evasion charges. Thus it might be assumed that the number of these cases would
remain relatively small.
15. Ibid. A related problem would be whether or not the victim, by condoning the
embezzlement, would forfeit his right to a deduction, allowed under INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 165(e). See Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 759 (1949). It is assumed that no deduction
would be allowed in such cases, but as condonation is likely only where relatively small
amounts are involved, this would not prove a serious problem. See Currier v. United
States, 166 F.2d 346, 348 (lst Cir. 1948) where the court ruled that no deduction would
be allowed if the victim had a cause of action against the embezzler. The court did
not consider that by allowing the embezzler to retain the funds the victim actually is
making a gift to him. Gifts are not taxable under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 102(a).
See Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 330 (1943). Were this money
declared a gift, it would be taxable as such, but not as income. However, the Court
ruled this taxable as income. See note 16 infra.
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delay assessing the tax until these conditions occur makes administration
of the tax difficult.
Subsequent cases quickly whittled away the broad Wilcox ruling. 6
In 1952 the Supreme Court was given an opportunity to re-appraise
Wilcox in Rutkin v. United States," an evasion prosecution concerning
extorted money. There a defense based on the Wilcox holding failed,
and the Court ruled that extorted funds were taxable. The majority
opinion"s limited Wilcox "to its facts."'" The Court, ignoring the claim
of right concept, held any gain, legal or illegal, taxable if the recipient
". .. has such control over it that as a practical matter he derives a
readily realizable economic value from it."" While the case involved
only proceeds from extortion, the decision was a victory for the Com-
missioner because of the expanded income concept that was adopted.'
Lower courts circumscribed Wilcox still further.22  Attempts to use
16. In 1946 Chief Counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue backed down from
the former bureau position and grudgingly admitted that "the correct rule appears to
be that the mere act of embezzlement does not of itself result in taxable income in-
asmuch as the owner does not lose title to the property embezzled." G.C.M. 24945,
1946-2 Cum. BULL. 27, 28. He was quick to add that ". . . where the owner condones
the taking of the property and forgives the indebtedness, taxable income may result to
the embezzler, depending on the facts in the particular case." Ibid.
17. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952). Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T.C.
585 (1949). For an excellent discussion and comparison of the Rutkin and Wilcox
positions see Note, Taxation of Misappropriated Property: Decline and Iiwomplete Fall
of Wilcox, 62 YALE L.J. 662 (1953). See also 19 BROOKLYN L. REV. 151 (1953); 20
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 796 (1952); 7 MIAmI L.Q. 256 (1952); 36 MINN,. L. REv. 988
(1952); 7 RUTGERS L. REv. 422 (1953); 26 TEMp. L.Q. 211 (1952); 100 U. PA. L. REv.
595 (1952); 38 VA. L. REV. 682 (1952); 28 WAS H. L. REv. 67 (1953).
18. Mr. Justice Burton, who wrote the lone dissent in Wilcox, drafted the ma-
jority opinion. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Reed and Douglas dissented.
19. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138 (1952).
20. Id. at 137.
21. The Rutkin equation of taxable income and economic benefit stems from
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933). There the Court held that tax liability "may
rest upon the enjoyment by the taxpawer of privileges and benefits so substantial and
important as to make it reasonable and just to deal with him as if he were the owner,
and to tax him on that basis." Id. at 678. See Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378
(1930). See also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Helvering v. Horst,
311 U.S. 112 (1940). For the most recent judicial view of the Wilcox and Rutkin
definitions see United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1955).
The Wilcox and Rutkin cases are distinguishable on facts. In Rutkin the statute
of limitations had run against the victim; hence he could not be harmed by the govern-
ment collecting taxes. This distinction was not articulated by the Court. Brief for
the United States in Opposition, p. 14, and Brief for Appellee, pp. 35-36, Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
22. Two later tax court cases upheld the Wilcox ruling. George H. Conradson,
5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 112 (1946); Agnes McCue, 5 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 141 (1946).
Under the view expressed in Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T.C. 858 (1949)-"The Wilcox
case does not stand for the proposition that all funds fraudulently or illegally acquired
are non-taxable. . .. "-the courts quickly began to narrow the scope of Wilcox. See
Rothwacks, Taxability of Corporate Receipts Diverted by Officer-Stockholder, 7 N.Y.U.
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 573 (1949) ; Note, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 188 (1955).
NOTES
an embezzlement defense to evasion prosecutions met unanimous defeat.23
Money "embezzled" by owner-officers of small corporations was held
taxable. 4 In 1954 the Eighth Circuit, forsaking any hope of reconciling
the Supreme Court cases, held taxable the funds stolen by an employee from
his employer.2" While the act would seemingly qualify as embezzlement
under state law, the court refused to be bound by the state definition and
adopted instead a free-wheeling interpretation of embezzlement for fed-
eral tax purposes..2 ' Further cases held the Wilcox rationale inapplicable
to bribery,27 swindling," and other related crimes. 29  Thus, the once
broad rule that embezzled proceeds are not taxable now appears so limited
as to be effectively overruled."0
Appraisal of the soundness of the Wilcox ruling necessitates an ex-
amination of the validity of the claim of right and tax lien arguments-
the bedrock on which the case was erected. The claim of right doctrine
was limited by requiring a bona fide claim and the "absence of a definite,
unconditional obligation to return that which would otherwise constitute
a gain." 1  This extension indicates that taxability rests on indisputable
23. See Holzman, supra note 9. Note, 62 YAILx L.J. 662, 668-669 (1953).
24. Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247 (3rd Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S.
967 (1954) ; Currier v. United States, 166 F.2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948) ; Alexander Gross-
handler, 13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 383 (1954); J.J. Dix, Inc., 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 536
(1953). See 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1298 (1954); 23 U. CINN. L. REv. 362 (1954).
25. Marienfeld v. United States, 214 F.2d 632, 636, 639 (8th Cir. 1954).
26. Id. at 636. "[T]he present question is not whether appellant was guilty of
embezzlement under the law of Missouri, but whether the funds he received were his
income under the Act of Congress defining taxable income. State law will not be
decisive in that determination." Ibid. Kann v. Commissioner, 210 F.2d 247, 251 (3rd
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 967 (1954); Daine v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 449,
451 (2d Cir. 1948). See also Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946).
27. United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955).
28. Rollinger v. United States, 208 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1953); Akers v. Scofield,
167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1948).
29. Briggs v. United States, 214 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1954) (fraudulent land sales)
United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir. 1948) and Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C.
1253 (1948) (black market operations) ; Greenfeld v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 318 (4th
Cir. 1947) (receipts from sale of stolen bearer bonds).
30. The court in United States v. Bruswitz, 219 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1955) summarizes
the present judicial view of Wilcox. "It is difficult to perceive what, if anything, is
left of the Wilcox holding after Rutldn v. United States. . . . The reconciliation
evolved by other circuits seems to be that even temporary dominion over illicit gains
is sufficient to render them taxable in the hands of the holder thereof. . . . Although
eminently justified by the Rutkin holding, this formulation in effect does what the
Supreme Court purported not to do; it overrules the Wilcox case. ' Id. at 61. It
would seem that the only situation where Wilcox might still apply would be where the.
embezzler had first been convicted of the state crime of embezzlement, i.e., the "facts"'
of the Wilcox case.
31. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946). The claim of right was
introduced into income tax law by Mr. Justice Brandeis in North American Oil Con-
solidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). "If a taxpayer receives earnings under a
claim of right and without restrictions as to its disposition, he has received income
which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed that he is not entitled
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
title,32 a far cry from the humble origin of the doctrine in property law. 3
Previously, the claim of right theory served as a general "money in the
pocket" test to bring income within the scope of taxation rather than to
exclude it. 4 Control or possession of money has generally been held
sufficient criterion for determining taxability,3 5 primarily as an out-
growth of the annual accounting income system which necessitates a
relatively sure guide for both taxpayer and tax collector. Surely title is
of no concern to the embezzler who has the money and can enjoy its
economic benefits. It would appear that the stringent standards of
Wilcox were imposed to provide for the contingency that the embezzler
might be caught and forced to repay." On this possibility the Supreme
Court excluded from income all embezzled proceeds. Yet, nowhere else
does the possibility of repayment render broad categories of income im-
mune from taxation." The contingency that the embezzler might not
repay would seem to serve as an equally compelling argument for adopt-
ing the less rigid "economic benefit" test as proposed by Rutkin.3" Not
to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore its
equivalent." Id. at 424. For the development of this doctrine see Holzman, Tax Clas-
sics, 30 TAXES 299 (1952) ; Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10
TAX. L. REV. 381 (1955) ; Note, Taxing Unsettled Income: The "Claim of Right" Test,
58 YALE L.J. 955 (1949).
32. Note, 62 YALE L.J. 662, 664 (1953). See also Bartlett, The Impact of State
Laws on Federal Income Taxation, 25 CHI-KENT L. REv. 103, 131 (1947). "[T]axa-
tion is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is with actual . . .
benefit for which the tax is paid." Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930);
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 678 (1933); cf. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280,
283 (1932).
33. Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 282 (1953).
34. "There is a claim of right when funds are received and treated by a taxpayer
as belonging to him. The fact that subsequently the claim is found to be invalid by
a court does not change the fact that the claim did exist." Id. at 282. The Commis-
sioner has used the claim of right doctrine generally to compel the payment of the tax.
Ibid; United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951); North American Oil Consolidated
v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). The concept is employed to add certainty to the
annual accounting period. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590, 592 (1951). See 2
MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 12.103 (1942).
35. Every related evasion case since Rutkin, and some before it, talk in terms of
Judge Learned Hand's view in National City Bank of New York v. Helvering, 98 F.2d
93 (2d Cir. 1938), i.e., that possession was a sufficient criterion for determining tax-
ability. See notes 24, 25, 27, 28, 29 supra.
36. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). See also Mr. Justice Bur-
ton's dissent, id. at 414.
37. "No rule is better established in tax law than that which requires the taxpayer
who derives a profit in a particular year to return it as income in the year when re-
ceived-even though it may be claimed he is not entitled to retain the money and even
though he may be ultimately adjudged liable to restore its equivalent." Barker v.
Magruder, 95 F.2d 122, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1938). See also Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S.
193, 201 (1934).
38. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952). This test has been fol-
lowed exclusively by the circuits. Brunswitz v. United States, 219 F.2d 59, 61-62 (2d
Cir. 1955).
NOTES
only would this be more easily administered under the annual accounting
concept, but it would restore certainty to the law by aligning recent cases
to the traditional meaning of claim of right.
The tax lien argument on which the 'Wilcox case rests is also ques-
tionable. The necessity of protecting the victim is nonexistent where the
embezzler is solvent and could pay the victim as well as the Government.
In such a situation the embezzler is immunized against taxation by a
clearly inappropriate policy. If the proceeds are traceable, the victim
may recover them, for the Government's tax lien will attach only to
property of the embezzler; and embezzled funds, identifiable in any
form, are not his property. 9 Furthermore, if the victim has obtained
a judgment against the embezzler and levied on his property, the Govern-
ment lien could attach to only the remaining property." Only when the
funds are not traceable, or when the victim has not acted diligently to
obtain a lien against the embezzler, does the tax lien affect the victim.
In this case the victim is merely an unsecured creditor. As the sole
purpose of the government's tax lien is to assure the collection of revenue
before private creditors drain the funds, the lien generally operates to
the disadvantage of ordinary, honest creditors. 4 Though the victim may
be no more than a creditor the Wilcox Court deemed him worthy of
special treatment. This seems a debatable basis for excluding embezzle-
ment from taxation.42
39. In State of Washington v. Byrne, a larceny situation, it was held that the
government did not acquire a lien on money which was not the property of the criminal
who obtained it by false pretenses. State v. Byrne, 4 CCH 1955 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(54-2 U.S.T.C,.) ff 5357.032 (Super. Ct. of Washington). The government tax lien
attaches "upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal," belonging
to the taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6321. See 1 STAT. 515 (1797), 31 U.S.C.
§ 191 (1952), which gives the federal government a preference for all debts owing to
it, including taxes. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926). See also 9 MERTENS,
FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 54.10-.37 (1943). Were the funds traceable it would seem
that the tax lien would not apply to such stolen proceeds. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §
60.18, 60.24; 4 id. 70.25 (14th ed., Moore, ed., 1941). On "property" subject to tax liens
see Anderson, Federal Tax Liens-Their Nature and Priority, 41 CALIF. L. REv. 241,
245 (1953; Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcement, 33 VA. L. REv. 13, 14
(1947) ; Kennedy, Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career
of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 YALE L.J. 905, 919 (1954) ; 9 MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION, § 54.47-.50 (1943).
40. The Court appears to have ignored the situation found in Wilcox where the
victim had ample time to sue, obtain judgment and get a lien against the assets of the
embezzler. The tax lien takes subject to the earlier lien of a judgment creditor. INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a).
41. Should the victim and the Internal Revenue Service discover the embezzlement
at the same time, a race of diligence might result to perfect liens on the embezzler's prop-
erty. In such a race the advantage would obviously lie with the victim.
42. Theoretically, protection of the embezzler's victim has merit. The one who
suffers the loss is the true owner. The thief has no right to any of the money, and the
Government has still less right to levy taxes on it. See 28 WAsH. L. REv. 67, 68 (1953).
This theory, if expanded, would exclude all illegal profits from taxation. It has -been
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While the Court was concerned about jeopardizing the victim's re-
covery of embezzled funds, it was patently unconcerned with protecting
the victim's rights to income earned by those funds when it asserted that
any income resulting from use of embezzled funds would be taxable."'
Under ordinary constructive trust principles, if the original sum belongs
to the owner-victim, so too would any gains derived from that sum.44
Any tax lien whether from resulting profits or stolen principal, would
have the same effect on the victim's recovery. To be consistent with
the Wilcox approach, profits gained from use of the stolen funds should
be returned to the victim, then taxed.45
If the policy of protecting the victim has merit, the whole matter
could be resolved by modifying the tax law to give the victim priority
over the Government lien. This solution, urged by those in favor of
taxing embezzled proceeds,46 might boomerang. The likelihood of col-
lecting taxes on embezzled funds under these circumstances may become
so unattractive to the government from a revenue standpoint that lax tax
enforcement might result. If revenue collection is the chief purpose of
the income tax, 7 and if, as the Wilcox Court assumed, embezzlers are
usually discovered in a semi-solvent state, the prospects are grim that
the trouble and expense necessitated by securing a second grade lien
would produce sufficient revenue to make the effort profitable. Further-
more, the advisibility of thus protecting the embezzlement victim may
argued that the government should not dignify crime by "cutting itself in" on part of
the illegal gain. Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1926) ; see also
Smith v. Minister of Finance, [1925] Can. Sup. Ct. 405, 2 D.L.R. 1137. However, the
federal government realistically has recognized the existence of illegal activity and
accordingly has levied against this ripe source of revenue.
43. 'Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 409 (1946).
44. "A converter, it is true, is not a constructive trustee of property converted.
• . . [but] the owner of converted property is entitled to enforce a constructive trust
on the product [of the stolen property]." 3 ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 508.1 (1939). "It is
accordingly now well-settled that the owner of stolen property can follow it into its
product. He may at his option claim an equitable lien upon the product to secure his
claim for the value of the converted property, or claim the product itself as held upon
a constructive trust for him." Ibid. See also Vorlander v. Keyes, 1 F.2d 67 (8th Cir.
1924).
45. This assumes that the victim took his deduction in the year the embezzlement
was discovered. If the victim had not taken a deduction and later regained the money,
no tax on the amount returned would be levied. Gains made from the principal would
be taxable. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 165(a), 165(e). If the loss is covered by in-
surance the victim can claim no deduction. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 165(a). See
Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problems, Too, 26 TAXES 1097, 1103-04
(1948). The insurance company, upon compensating the victim, normally will be sub-
rogated to his rights against the wrongdoer. VANCE, INSURANCE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
46. See Mr. Justice Burton's dissent, Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 414
(1946).
47. "The income tax law is strictly a revenue measure enacted for the purpose of
iaising the necessary revenues for the Federal Government." James P. McKenna, 1
B.T.A. 326, 330 (1925).
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be challenged as preferring one private creditor to another.
Assuming that embezzled funds could be made subject to taxation
by adoption of the Rutkii test, the existing tax law would furnish ade-
quate protection to all parties. First, an embezzler may steal and be
apprehended in the same tax year. If he can repay the victim the same
year he should be able to claim a deduction as an expense for the pro-
duction of income s or as a transaction loss.4" While this may stretch
the concept of deductions slightly, it seems inconsistent to tax the em-
bezzler for property he no longer possesses or controls. Since return
of stolen property is legally and socially desirable, there should appear
no strong public policy against allowing this deduction." Clearly a pur-
pose of taxing embezzlers is to levy only on proceeds which they enjoy
with no intention of returning. Should the embezzler be unable to re-
pay the victim, the matter becomes more complicated. If the embezzler
can not repay, or can only partially repay, the balance that he retains is
income under the economic benefit theory and a tax lien attaching to
the embezzler's property puts the victim in a secondary position to the
government."' Because of the deduction, or if the tax lien remains un-
satisfied, the government would collect no immediate revenue.
Where the transaction takes place over a period of years, the system
of requiring income to be reported for tax purposes on a yearly basis,
complicates the situation. If the embezzler has reported his illegal gain
48. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 212 provides a deduction for "all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(l) for the production or
collection of income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income. .. ." It is conceivable that returned embezzled
proceeds would qualify under either of the two categories.
49. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(c)(2) provides for deductions for "losses in-
curred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected with a trade or
business." Embezzlement is a "transaction" entered into for profit, and repayment
would necessarily be a loss resulting. If wagering losses are deductible to the extent
of wagering gains, it would seem but a short jump to embezzlement repayments. See
Id. § 165(d). Embezzled losses should be deductible to the extent of embezzled gains.
50. Legitimate expenses incurred in an illegitimate business are deductible, Comeaux
v. Commissioner, 171 F.2d 394, 400 (10th Cir. 1949) ; and repayment of embezzled funds
is clearly a legitimate expense, much more so than are gambling losses. The public
policy argument is directed against letting a criminal profit from his activity by a tax
deduction to the harm of all citizens. Commissioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co.,
148 F.2d 276, 277 (5th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945). Here the deduc-
tion serves only to assist the victim, not to exempt the embezzler from paying a tax on
income. The embezzler ip this situation has no income on which to levy the tax. If
the basis for the tax is punishment, not revenue, then a different argument might be
made. See text p. 498, infra. In general, see Baker, The Federal Taxing Power and
Organized Crine, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 121, 132-149.
51. In this situation it would be likely that the victim will have gotten a prior lien
on the embezzler's property. Thus only where no such lien is obtained would the victim
be "injured." If the lien law were modified as suggested by Mr. Justice Burton, it
would be applicable here to give the victim priority.
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under some fictitious classification, e.g., "investments," 52 and then in a
later year is discovered and repays his victim, he might claim a deduction
under Section 1341 of the 1954 Code.5" Having reported income to
which he claimed an "unrestricted right"5 4 and subsequently finding this
claim invalid, repayment should entitle the embezzler to a deduction.55
Designed to mitigate the harshness of the annual accounting system,
Section 1341 allows the taxpayer to deduct for subsequent repayment of
amounts upon which income taxes were previously paid.5" It would
seem feasible to allow Section 1341 to operate in the embezzlement area
thereby furthering the concept that one should be taxable only for what
is ultimately income.
Even where the embezzler has failed to report his stolen gain and
is later discovered and repays, he should still be able to claim a deduction
upon repayment under Section 1341. In this situation the Commissioner
would, upon discovery of the embezzlement and evasion, assess a tax
deficiency against the embezzler.5 7 In effect this makes the unreported
embezzled proceeds "included in gross income for a prior taxable year.""
The section was, obviously, not adopted with embezzlers in mind and
its full meaning remains for future interpretation. Whether the earlier
income was included by the taxpayer or subsequently by the Commis-
sioner seems immaterial to the furtherance of the policy underlying the
section.
VVhen the embezzler is discovered insolvent in a later year, until he
52. Rare indeed would be the cases where a taxpayer blatantly lists such income as
"embezzled funds."
53. This section provides for a deduction if "an item was included in gross in-
come for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an
unrestricted right to such item" and it later develops that such unrestricted right was
non-existent. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (a) (1), (2).
54. The Code fails to define "unrestricted right." Whether it is meant to be in-
terpreted as "claim of right" is left uncertain. For an examination of the new provision
see Webster, supra note 31 at 381.
55. The section allows the taxpayer a choice of methods for determining his de-
duction when the amount in question exceeds $3,000; INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §
1341(a) (3). See note 56 infra.
56. The new law gives the taxpayer his choice of either recomputing the tax for
the prior year and excluding the amount repaid on the basis of that year, or merely
deducting from present income the funds that were repaid, whichever is most beneficial
to the taxpayer. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (a) (4), (5).
57. See Webster, supra note 31 at 388.
58. It might be argued in rebuttal that unless the taxpayer reported this uncertain
income it would not "appear" that he had an unrestricted right to it. The statute leaves
unexplained the question to whom the unrestricted claim is to "appear," the taxpayer,
a reasonable man, or the Commissioner. See Webster, supra note 31 at 387. If a
secondary purpose of the section was to encourage the reporting of all revenue by making
repayment-deduction provisions attractive, one who failed to report should not be
granted the benefits of the section. This would make the section a weapon to enforce
reporting.
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repays the victim, he cannot claim a deduction under section 1341 or
any other provision and the Government tax lien attaches. Here, neither
the Government nor the victim, regardless who has lien priority, may be
able to collect. 0 Since there are no present assets, the value of any lien
would be in regard to after-acquired property.6" After the victim is
repaid, the embezzler, if allowed to claim his deduction under Section
1341,.owes no tax. The Government then has gone to a great amount
of expense and trouble to assess taxes on income which later ceased to
be and stands to benefit only from interest"' and evasion charges.6 2
The assumption of the Wilcox Court was that the embezzler would
always repay the victim, and that no tax could be levied until repayment
was no longer legally enforceable. This assumption would be reversed,
however, were embezzled funds made taxable income; the Service would
view all such proceeds as taxable income until there was repayment.
This would assure the victim of being repaid before the embezzler was
granted tax relief, and should work no undue hardship on the victim.
However, from a practical standpoint, the Service will generally be deal-
ing with embezzlement cases which have come to light through local
prosecutions. 3 Since forced repayment is there likely, the Code would
permit deductions; consequently, there would be little realizable revenue
from taxing this source of income. In this respect, even were the law
59. Again, the revenue aspects of this would appear bleak for the government,
especially if the victim has obtained a prior lien against the embezzler.
60. The tax lien applies to property owned by the delinquent at any time during
the life of the lien. Glass City Bank of Jeanette, Pa. v. United States, 326 U.S. 265,
268 (1945); Citizens National Trust & Savings Bank v. United States, 135 F.2d 527
(9th Cir. 1943) ; Nelson v. United States, 139 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1943). See Anderson,
stepra note 39 at 248.
61. Unfortunately, section 1341 makes no provision for interest. Though designed
to aid the taxpayer, the section does not relieve him of interest charges. Interest is
charged at the rate of six percent per annum for all taxes unpaid at the time pre-
scribed for payment. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6601 (a). Were this interest to vanish
with the tax, the Service would stand to collect still less revenue. See CROCKETT, THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATS, 129-137 (1955) for a general discussion
of interest and evasion fines.
62. The 1954 Code consolidated all the tax "crimes" with their varying degrees of
severity. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7201-7214. Conviction under § 7201 may result
in a $10,000 fine, a five year jail sentence, and prosecution expenses. Whether or not
the money in dispute is later repaid to the victim the crime of evasion has still been
committed when the embezzler is shown to have willfully attempted to evade the tax.
For a discussion of the various penalties see BAITER, FRAUD UNDER FEDERAL TAX LAW
323-355 (2d ed. 1953) ; Gordon, Income Tax Penalties, 5 TAX L. REv. 131 (1950).
Granted, if no deduction were allowed, the embezzler would have to pay the tax
regardless of whether or not he repaid the victim. But would this be a tax on income?
If the embezzler is a one-way conduit handling funds from victim back again to
victim, the tax might be an excise tax, perhaps, but not a tax on income. If no deduc-
tion were allowed the embezzler, the only justification for allowing the tax would be its
use as a sanction against the crime itself.
63. See discussion p. 501 infra.
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changed, the number of embezzlement evasion cases would probably
remain quite small.
Inclusion of embezzled funds in gross income would serve another
purpose more important than immediate revenue production from the
limited area of embezzlement. If embezzled funds were made taxable,
the outer limit of what constitutes gross income for taxation purposes
would be clearly delineated and at the same time expanded. The concept
of income as funds giving readily recognizable economic benefit would
be established in the most extreme of situations. Whenever a question
arose whether or not proceeds could be classified as gross income, they
could be compared to embezzled funds. Certainty and administrative
convenience would result, and this, perhaps, is the Commissioner's chief
purpose in seeking to tax embezzlers.
Taxation of embezzlers might prove useful in another manner, that
is, as a sanction. If this were found an effective method of policing
embezzlers and deterring embezzlement, the argument for taxibility
might be greatly strengthend. When the government initiates a tax
evasion prosecution against a criminal, it seeks directly to punish him
for the federal crime of evading taxes. In so doing it indirectly punishes
him for committing the illegal act which led to the tax evasion. Thus,
while the two crimes are clearly separate, they are interrelated in such a
manner that the criminal taxpayer always faces a dilemma. If he reports
such gains, even under fictitious classifications, he may render himself
liable for state prosecution as tax returns may, under statutory restric-
tions,64 be examined by state officials. If he fails to report the illegal
income, he may be prosecuted for evasion, and in the process the illegal
source may be revealed, likewise leading to state prosecution. There
exists, then, a strong possibility of using the federal tax evasion prosecu-
tion as a sanction against this local criminal activity.
Other criminal activities have been taxed successfully,6" and the
use of evasion prosecutions to enforce the tax law appears to have more
64. Tax returns are considered confidential public records, but may be examined
by state officers if the Governor first requests permission and the inspection is for the
purpose of administering any state law. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6103(b). Penalties
are applied for unlawful disclosure of such information. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7213.
See Webster, Inspection and Publicity of Federal Tax Returins, 22 TENN. L. REv. 451
(1952).
65. See in general, Baker, supra note 50; Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of
Crime, 29 CHI-KENT L. REv. 197 (1951); Geller & Rogers, supra note 3; Lyon, The
Crime of Income Tax Fraud: Its Present Status and Function, 53 COLUm. L. Rv. 476
(1953); Schoeneman, The Commissioner's War on Racketeers, 29 TAXES 347 (1951).
Congress, following the Kefauver Investigations, urged greater use of the Service in
prosecuting known racketeers for tax evasion. S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.,
4, 7-10, 190 (1951).
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than paid its way.6" A special racket squad now exists for the specific
purpose of ferreting out gamblers and racketeers for evasion suits.67 As
over 90,000,000 returns are filed each year,6" close scrutiny of each re-
turn is impossible.69 If, however, an investigation leads to criminal
felony prosecution,"' conviction is almost assured.7
Constitutionally, there would seem to be no bar against such a use
of the taxing power, as regulatory and destructive taxation has long
been allowed," the 1951 federal wagering tax being the most recent ex-
ample."8 The question of federalism was broached by Mr. Justice Black
66. Commissioner Schoeneman reported that in the years 1947-1951 the Intelligence
Unit of the Service made 1700 tax fraud investigations of racketeers and gamblers and
collected nearly $129,000,000. This was only 10% of the total tax fraud investigations
made during that period. Schoeneman, supra note 65 at 350. By 1952, however, about
half of the criminal evasion prosecutions were in the gambler-racketeer class. CROCKETT,
op. cit. supra note 61, at 137.
67. Commissioner T. Coleman Andrews reported that in 1953 the racket squad had
collected "some $2,000,000" at a cost of 10% of that amount. Andrews, The Philosophy
of Tax Administration, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 46TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, NATIONAL
TAX ASSOCIATION, 532 (1953). In is first year of operation the Treasury's racket
squad, operating on a $15,000,000 budget, collected $95,000,000 in taxes and penalties.
See Note, 62 YALE L.J. 662, 672 n. 58 (1953).
68. For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, 93,208,277 returns were filed,
67,176,407 reporting income tax. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER ON INTERNAL
REVENUE, TaAS. DEPT. Doc. No. 3190, p. 5 (1954).
69. In 1953 3,486,977 returns were selected for examination. From these 440 full-
scale investigations of racketeer cases were initiated. ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit. supra
note 68, at 7, 11. Methods of selecting returns for examination are described by
Schwerdtfeger, Federal Prosecution of Income Tax Cases, 40 Ky. L.J. 400 (1952);
Spencer, Tax Practice and Procedure in the Collector's Office, 30 TAXES 120 (1952).
A tax fraud case may be uncovered by a variety of methods. Routine audit, newspaper
and court reports, reports of business transactions and government agencies and tips
for revenge or reward are all possible sources of information utilized by the Service.
BALTER, op. cit. supra note 62, at 12-14; Baradel, How A Practitioner Should Prepare for
a Fraud Examination, 12 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 57-73 (1954);
Murphy, Criminal Income Tax Evasion, 48 Nw. U. L. REv. 317, 320, 323-326 (1953);
Spencer, supra at 122. In the 1953 fiscal year 2,691 claims for rewards were filed by
informers under what is now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7623. ANNUAL REPORT, op. cit.
supra note 68, at 43.
70. See note 62 supra. There is a wide range of discretion in any investigation
or prosecution. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways
and Means, Internal Revenue Investigation, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 1008 (1951) ; Lyon,
supra note 65 at 484.
71. An estimated 98.2% of such prosecutions resulted in convictions in 1952, ac-
cording to the former Assistant Attorney General. Hearings, supra note 70 at 1003.
72. "[A] tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activity taxed." United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44
(1950). Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937). This is true even if
the revenue purpose of the tax is secondary. See DOWLING & EDWARDS, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 159-162 (1954) ; Note, 29 IND. L.J. 377 (1954).
73. 65 STAT. 529 (1951), 26 U.S.C. §§ 3285-3298 (1952). This statute was upheld
in United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) ; United States v. Smith, 106 F.
Supp. 9 (S.D. Cal. 1952); United States v. Nadler, 105 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Cal. 1952);
Combs v. Snyder, 101 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. 1951). See Note, 41 Ky. L.J. 346 (1953).
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in a vigorous dissent in the Rutkin case.74 Whether taxing of embezzled
funds would be a federal encroachment into local duties depends pri-
marily on the methods and quantity of evasion prosecutions, the latter
seemingly destined to remain quite small.7 5
While taxing embezzled returns is possible from a revenue and a
constitutional basis, the question remains whether it would prove an
effective criminal sanction against embezzlement. The embezzler pre-
sents a different target than the gambler or racketeer. He is generally
unknown as a crimnial. Most embezzlers are trusted and respected busi-
nessmen whose first "borrowing" is made with an intent to repay. 6
Loot acquired from embezzlement is usually sporadic, and the embezzler,
the smartest of all criminals,7" may escape discovery for years. Further-
more, the public views the embezzler with a sympathetic eye. "From the
modern viewpoint is the crime of being caught after you borrow and
before you pay it back. '78  While embezzlement losses are estimated at
close to $4,000,000 annually,79 prosecutions are few, convictions are
fewer, and full sentences rarely imposed."0
Evasion prosecution would offer two deterring factors. First, it
would strike the embezzler where he is most fearful-through discovery
and its resultant publicity. Wide publicity of evasion convictions of em-
bezzlers who had escaped local prosecution might serve to deter other
less-hardy embezzlers, or at least tend to make them more cautious in
filing tax returns, both commendable accomplishments. Secondly, it
would subject the previously unprosecuted criminal to a possible state
prosecution, and would place additional penalties on those embezzlers
who had already been convicted of that crime.81
Even so, the possibility of using tax evasion prosecutions as an all
74. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 140 (1952). Black charged that taxing
extortioners was a waste of federal time and money and was only a scheme to ... give
Washington [D.C.] more and more power to punish purely local crimes. . . " Id. at
141. However, he would allow gamblers and racketeers to be taxed as they are in a
"regular business." Ibid.
75. For the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination aspect of reporting income see
Murphy, supra note 69 at 333-340; Doyle, Fraud Cases: Review of Law and Bureau
Policy, 12 N.Y.U. INSTITUTE OF FEDERAL TAXATION 1-14 (1954); Redlich, Searches,
Seizures and Self-Incrimzination in Tax Cases, 10 TAX L. REv. 191 (1955) ; Note, 68
HARV. L. REV. 340 (1955).
76. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 289-298 (2d ed. 1952).
77. MuRcHISON, CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE 58-62 (1926).
78. Jones, Put It This Way, Saturday Evening Post, March 12, 1955, p. 62.
79. Peterson, Why Honest People Steal, 38 J. CRImz. L., C. & P.S. 94 (1947).
80. Surety companies estimated that less than 1% of all embezzlers are prosecuted
by their employers. HALL, op. cit. supra note 76, at 305, 319-325.
81. As the penalties imposed on the embezzler are often quite light, or non-existent,
the addition of a full evasion penalty might have real meaning. Yet, evasion prosecu-
tions seldom result in the imposition of a full sentence. See Lyon, szpra note 65, at 479.
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out weapon to discover and punish every embezzler seems without merit.
The cost of searching out all embezzlers would be prohibitive, as it would
necessitate considerably more investigation than is now needed for
known criminals.1 2 It is submitted that the only feasible means of using
the evasion prosecution as a sanction against embezzlers would be to
prosecute only those cases uncovered in the normal routine of audit and
investigation. The remote likelihood of discovery and prosecution under
this procedure renders this a doubtful sanction and would not warrant
a change in the existing law. 8
Revision of the Revenue Code to include embezzled proceeds would
seem to be ineffective as a sanction. Whether or not sufficient revenue
would be produced to warrant the revision would depend on the number
of embezzlers taxed by the Commissioner who ultimately did not repay
their victims so that no deductions could be claimed. The really signifi-
cant impact of labelling embezzled funds as income would be the under-
lying policy decision making readily recognizable economic benefit as the
test of taxable income. The limits of gross income would be clearly ex-
tended. Since the Rutki case has accepted this position and subsequent
court decisions have followed this interpretation, it seems that the Com-
missioner has achieved his goal regardless of the Wilcox case and without
the aid of legislation.
82. Furthermore, existing revenue practices, especially prosecuting only "sure"
cases and not prosecuting evaders already convicted of more serious crimes, would stand
in the way of using the tax as an all-out sanction. By prosecuting only "sure" cases
the Service evinces a belief that a smaller number of convictions, well-publicized, is a
more effective deterrent to evasion than numerous unsuccessful prosecutions. Hearings,
supra note 70 at 1002; BALTER, op. cit. supra note 62, at 91; CROcKETT, op. cit. supra
note 61, at 136; Lyons, supra note 65 at 488. The practice of not prosecuting an evader
already convicted hinges on the belief that the imposition of the lighter sentence (which
may not apply to embezzlement situations) might create a feeling that tax fraud carries
innocuous penalties. Lyons, supra note 65 at 488-89. Crowded dockets also argue for
prosecuting other cases more rapidly. Ibid.
83. A former Commissioner of the Service has admitted that evasion prosecution
is probably overrated as- a sanction against local crimes. "True, we can harass
gamblers with tax charges and make their 'take' less attractive to them, but I doubt,
seriously whether a tax prosecution will ever be the effective weapon it is so popularly
thought to be in this area. The record would seem to indicate that many gamblers are
just as willing to gamble on the possibility of being picked up on a tax charge as they
are on anything else." Schoeneman, supra note 65 at 352. But see S. REP. No. 307,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., 190 (1951).
